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LIMITATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDING PROCESS 
John R. Vile * 
I 
Article V of the Constitution has been variously praised as "the 
keystone" of the constitutional arch, 1 "one of the lynch pins of the 
American federal system,"2 and as "perhaps the most important 
part" of the Constitution.3 On the surface its provisions are fairly 
straightforward. An amendment becomes part of the Constitution 
when proposed by two-thirds majorities in both Houses of Congress 
and subsequently ratified by three-quarters of the state legislatures 
or special conventions called for this purpose.4 Alternatively, two-
thirds of the states may petition Congress to call a special conven-
tion to propose constitutional amendments, which are then again 
subject to the approval of three-quarters of the states. Article V 
contains only two stated limits on the amending process. One, 
designed to permit slave importation for twenty years, is no longer 
in force. The other, protecting the right of each state to "equal suf-
frage in the Senate," is addressed later in this paper. 
Despite its apparent simplicity, article V raises a number of 
unresolved and perplexing questions. What are the basic principles 
Head, Department of Social Sciences, McNeese State University. 
I. Martig, Amending the Constitution-Anicle Five: The Keystone of the Arch, 35 
MICH. L. REV. 1253, 1284 (1937). 
2. Heller, Limiting a Constitutional Convention: The State Precedents, 3 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 563, 564 (1982). 
3. Note, Good Intentions, New Inventions, and Article V Constitutional Conventions, 58 
TEX. L. REV. 131, (1979). 
4. The precise wording of article V is as follows: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislaturer. of three fourths of the 
several States, or by the Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the 
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by Congress; Provided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand c1ght hundred and eight 
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the 
first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate. 
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that underlie the amending process? What force should be given to 
the limitation on depriving states of their equal suffrage in the Sen-
ate? Are there unstated limits on the kinds of amendments that can 
be added to the Constitution?s Is it possible to pass an unamend-
able amendment or otherwise change the current amending pro-
cess? The answers to these conundrums help illuminate the most 
fundamental principles underlying the Constitution: 
Exploration of the reach of the amending power is more than mere indulgence in a 
brain teaser; it is an inquiry that can give us much insight into the way we think 
about our Constitution. When we answer the question as to what we can never do 
constitutionally, we have gone a long way toward clarifying the American concep-
tion of constitutionalism. 6 
II 
In declaring independence, the American colonists asserted 
that governments rest upon "the consent of the governed." They 
proclaimed the right of the people "to alter or to abolish" their ex-
isting form of government "and to institute new Government, lay-
ing its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in 
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety 
and Happiness."1 This the colonists did in creating the Articles of 
Confederation. When the Articles proved inadequate, a convention 
was called to create a government "adequate to the exigencies of the 
Union."s In creating this new Union, the Founding Fathers exer-
cised a domesticated version of the right to revolution that Jefferson 
had proclaimed eleven years earlier. 
By including a process for amendment, the Founders recog-
nized that the Constitution would not be perfect and would require 
change. 9 They also acknowledged that ultimately each generation 
5. Note Laurence Tribe's comment that "[b]oth because of its intrinsic interest and 
because of the light it may shed on procedural matters, the judiciary's potential role in the 
substantive arena merits more attention than it has so far received." Tribe, A Constitution 
We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REv. 433, 438 
(1983). 
6. Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 718 
(1981). 
7. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
8. THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE 
AMERICAN STATES 59 (W. Solberg ed. 1958) (quoting a report of the Annapolis Convention 
that issued a call for the Constitutional Convention). 
9. "The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has 
been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to 
provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and 
violence." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 202-03 (M. Farrand 
ed. 1911) (quoting the comments of George Mason). 
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would have to govern itself, 10 if not by rewriting, at least by pas-
sively assenting to,11 the rules by which it was governed. On the 
other hand, the Founders were keenly aware of their unique oppor-
tunity. They designed a document superior to ordinary legislation 
and resistant to change, so that the people would-as in a some-
what different context the Declaration had said they shouldi2-take 
a sober second look before changing the supreme law of the land. 
In short, the Founders balanced ultimate popular control against 
the needs for stability and security for liberty. As Madison said, the 
amending process "guards equally against that extreme facility 
which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme 
difficulty which might perpetuate its discovered faults."l3 
One can image other approaches to the problem of constitu-
tional change and stability. Because of inexperience, shortsighted-
ness, or inflated egos, some founders have written constitutions that 
were immutable like the laws of the Medes and the Persians, 14 
others have written laws that could be changed only by methods too 
cumbersome to be effective. Cromwell's proposed Instrument of 
GovernmentJs and some early New World charters evidenced one 
or the other variant of this mistake and came to similar ends.l6 
Constitutions that are too difficult to amend are likely to be ignored 
or replaced, either through peaceful but extralegal means, or by 
revolution. The United States Constitution itself was adopted in an 
extralegal fashion after the Articles of Confederation proved too 
difficult to amend.I7 
If an overly rigid constitution will be ignored, flouted, or abol-
10. See Adrienne Koch's analysis of the correspondence between Jefferson and Madison 
concerning Jefferson's assertion that "[t]he earth belongs always to the living generation." A. 
KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE 0REAT COLLABORATION 69-96 (1950). Also note 
Grover Rees's comment, "The amending process is a link, however tenuous, to the idea of 
government by consent." Rees, Constitutional Conventions and Constitutional Arguments: 
Some Thoughts About Limits, 6 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 79, 82 (1982). 
II. A great deal of ambiguity necessarily surrounds the notion of explicit and tacit 
consent. Compare J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 376-77 (1960) with id. at 
388-94. Also see D. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CoNTROL (1980). 
12. "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be 
changed for light and transcient causes." The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 
1776). 
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 296 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
14. Dan. 6:15, Esther 8:8. 
15. See Vile, The Saints' New Magna Chana: The Authorized Edition (to be published 
in upcoming issue of MODERN AGE). 
16. Cahn, An American Contribution, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 13-25 
(E. Cahn ed. 1954). 
17. Dellinger, The Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A Comparative 
Perspective, 45 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1982, at 283, 285. Article XIII of the Arti-
cles of Confederation provided "nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any 
on them [the Articles]; unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the United States, 
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ished, a constitution that can be changed at will has even less value. 
A nation with no brakes on the popular will offers little or no pro-
tection for fundamental rights whose recognition may in the short 
term be inconvenient or unpopular. This was of course a major 
colonial complaint against the British doctrine of legislative sover-
eignty; Jefferson made a similar criticism of the Virginia State Con-
stitution that had been adopted in the Revolutionary period.IB 
While the British Constitution is today praised for the security it 
offers to liberty, this praise rests on the grounds that informal un-
derstandings, customs, conventions, 19 and the character of the peo-
ple make the constitution less subject to radical change than the 
theory of legislative sovereignty would indicate. 
Constitutions, then, may be too rigid or too flexible. Madison 
argued that the American Constitution fell somewhere in between. 
Exactly where on the continuum the United States Constitution 
falls is a matter of periodic debate,2o but the current amending pro-
visions appear generally satisfactory, and the requisite majorities 
have never utilized the article V convention mechanism.21 
III 
Given the preceeding analysis, the article V provisions protect-
ing slave importation and guaranteeing equal state suffrage in the 
Senate are somewhat anomalous. Why did the Founders, otherwise 
and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state." THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION 
AND THE FORMATION Of THE UNION Of THE AMERICAN STATES, supra note 8, at 51. 
18. "173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one .... An elective despotism was 
not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free princi-
ples, but in which the . . . government should be so divided and one which should not only 
be founded on free principles, but balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no 
one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the 
others." T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE Of VIRGINIA 120 (1954). 
19. The written Constitution notwithstanding, the United States is itself subject to 
many of these same kinds of restraints. See H. HORWILL, THE USAGES Of THE AMERICAN 
CoNSTITUTION (1925). For the complex role that the courts play in establishing and inter-
preting such usages, and for the relationship of this process to article V, see Vile, The 
Supreme Court and the Amending Process, 8 GA. PoL. SCI. A.J., Fall 1980, at 33-66. 
20. See, e.g., Mussmano, Is the Amendment Process Too Difficult?, 57 AM. L. REV. 694 
(1923); see a/so W. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 148-49 
(1956); Ames, The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice, 63 PROC. AM. 
PHIL Soc'Y 62, 66 (1924); Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking 
the Amendment Process, 91 HARV. L. REV. 386, 427-30 (1983). 
21. Fierce debate continues to rage over such issues as the conditions under which Con-
gress is bound to call such a convention and how it would be organized. For references to 
some of the major works on the subject, see AMERICAN BAR AssociATION, AMENDMENT Of 
THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V 79-90 (1974). Also 
see W. EDEL, A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: THREAT OR CHALLENGE? (1981). For a 
discussion of past calls for a convention, see L. Healy, Past and Present Convention Calls: 
From Gay Abandon to Cautious Resistance (Nov. 1, 1984) (paper delivered at Southern 
Political Science Association, Savannah, Georgia). 
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so cognizant of the need for change, make these exceptions? What 
would happen if an amendment were passed to repeal the equal suf-
frage provision? Should an unamendable provision in an otherwise 
amendable constitution be ignored or disregarded like past 
unamendable constitutions, or does it have a different status? 
In addressing these questions, the records of the Constitutional 
Convention offer guidance. The major debates on the subject came 
in the closing week of deliberations. By September 10 the amending 
provision provided for Congress to call a Convention "[on] the ap-
plication of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States."22 Gerry, 
Hamilton, and Madison criticized this proposal. Gerry feared that 
two-thirds of the states might "bind the Union to innovations that 
may subvert the State-Constitutions altogether."23 Hamilton ar-
gued that the state legislatures would "not apply for alterations but 
with a view to increase their own powers, "24 and that ills would be 
better perceived by the national legislature. Madison objected to 
the vagueness of the Convention provision,2s and subsequently pro-
posed the following provision: 
The Legislature of the U-S- whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem 
necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several 
States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid . . . 
when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of 
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof .... 26 
Almost immediately, Rutledge amended this proposal to include 
the slave importation reservation, noting that "he never could agree 
to give a power by which the articles relating to slaves might be 
altered by the States not interested in that property and prejudiced 
against it. "27 
The amendment issue reemerged on September 15, when the 
present method of constitutional amendment was finalized. The 
provision requiring a constitutional convention upon the request of 
two-thirds of the states was adopted after Mason expressed fears 
that otherwise Congress would have too much contro1.2s More to 
the point, the provision for equal suffrage in the Senate was also 
accepted. Adoption followed Sherman's animadversions: "that 
three fourths of the States might be brought to do things fatal to 
particular States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving them of 
22. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 9, at 557. 
23. /d. at 557-58. 
24. /d. at 558. 
25. /d. 
26. /d. at 559. 
27. /d. 
28. /d. at 629·33. 
378 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:373 
their equality in the Senate."29 Hence, he said, "[T]he proviso in 
favor of the States importing slaves should be extended so as to pro-
vide that no State should be affected in its internal police, or de-
prived of its equality in the Senate. "3o Madison feared that the 
floodgates were about to be opened. "Begin with these special 
provisos," he noted, "and every State will insist on them, for their 
boundaries, experts &c."3I While enough delegates shared 
Madison's sentiments to narrow the range of Sherman's reserva-
tions, after rejecting a series of amendments proposed by Sher-
man,32 the Convention adopted Morris's proposal "that no State, 
without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Sen-
ate."33 Madison noted that, "This motion being dictated by the cir-
culating murmurs of the small States was agreed to without debate, 
no one opposing it, or on this question, saying no. "34 
Thus, the two limitations in article V were no mere accidents. 
While accepting proposals essential to pacifying the slave-holding 
states and the small states, the Convention rejected more radical 
proposals to void any interference in state police powers or to omit 
an amending process altogether. In effect, the Founders delineated 
four categories of rights and activities: those believed to need no 
specific constitutional protection; those thought to be protected by 
such mechanisms as bicameralism, the separation of powers, and 
judicial review;3s those considered sufficiently necessary, important, 
or endangered to be included in the Constitution subject to amend-
ment; and those guarantees thought to need additional security even 
against the amendment process. 
In writing the Constitution, the framers were in a sense estab-
lishing the rules of a game governed by an association, similar in 
certain respect to that governing college basketball. One desiring 
the advantages of the Constitution must abide by its provisions, just 
29. /d. at 629. 
30. /d. 
31. /d. at 630. 
32. These included a proposal to omit the three-fourths requirement for state ratifica-
tion and leave this to the discretion of future conventions; the proposal "that no State shall 
without its consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equal suffrage in the 
Senate," and the proposal "to strike out art V together." /d. 
33. /d. at 631. 
34. /d. 
35. The first two categories, to any meaningful extent, are indistinct. Clearly, however, 
mechanisms such as bicameralism and the separation of powers are means to an end rather 
than ends in themselves. To quote Walter Murphy, "the Constitution does not divide author-
ity between federal and state governments so that Americans can boast that the~ have feder-
alism. Nor does the Constitution create a network of shared powers at the national level so 
that citizens can take to the street celebrating a trifurcated institutional system." Murphy, 
An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL L. REV. 703, 748-49 (1980). 
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as one wanting the thrill of playing basketball must abide by basket-
ball rules. The nation is no more permanently bound to this Consti-
tution than a player is prevented from trying his luck at another 
game. Just as one cannot, however, share the joys of one game 
while following the rules of another, so too, one cannot reap the 
rewards of the Constitution while ignoring its rules, one of which 
specifies an unamendable provision. 
Nonetheless, some have argued that the equal suffrage provi-
sion is not legally binding. Such a view was advanced by Congress-
men who opposed passage of the Corwin Amendment, an 
amendment proposed as part of the Crittenden Compromise intro-
duced just prior to the Civil War with the intention of safeguarding 
slavery against further constitutional change.36 These Congressmen 
argued that the equal suffrage provision, like the proposed compro-
mise, was "a mere declaration."37 More recently, Edward S. 
Corwin and Mary L. Ramsey have argued that the equal suffrage 
provision "has the moral force of a promise given more than one 
hundred sixty years ago."Js While justifications for this view 
vary,39 it appears largely based on notions of popular sovereignty. 
For example, Corwin and Ramsey argue that "[i]f the amending 
power is the same power which ordained and established the origi-
nal Charter, any limitation on it must be considered as having only 
such force and validity as the amending power itself may at any 
time choose to accord it."40 
This view is profoundly mistaken. By accepting the Constitu-
tion and its strictures on the amending process (and every state join-
ing the Union has given such assent), the nation has already 
accepted certain restraints on the momentary popular will. It is un-
clear why the United States should be bound by one such restraint, 
the super-majorities required for most amendments, and not an-
other, the unanimous state consent required for altering a state's 
equal suffrage in the Senate. Acceptance of an unamendable provi-
sion in an otherwise amendable constitution is not a denial of sover-
eignty. The nation may indeed exercise its sovereignty by changing 
the equal suffrage provision but only by paying a price. That is, the 
nation may (to revert to the earlier analogy) choose a new constitu-
36. For a discussion of this proposal, see Linder, supra note 6, at 728-30. 
37. The language is that of Mr. Bigler. /d. at 729 n.67. 
38. Corwin & Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 185, 188 (1951). 
39. Linder, for example, cites, but does not accept, three such justifications: one based 
on popular sovereignty, one based on enforcement difficulties, and one based on natural law. 
See Linder, supra note 6, at 722-25. 
40. Corwin & Ramsey, supra note 38, at 188. 
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tional game, presumably either via a revolution or a revolutionary 
convention. A nation might even choose in writing a new constitu-
tion to keep most of the old rules but, if it is proceeding under the 
auspices of the existing constitutional scheme, it must follow that 
scheme or jeopardize the entire constitutional framework.4I In 
short, 
We are free to touch the Constitution, to shape it to fit current needs, even, if neces-
sary, to tear it up and write a new one. What we are not free to do is to ignore it, 
and that is precisely what those who urge the invalidity of the article five proviso 
would have us do.42 
IV 
The question of explicit restraints leads logically to the ques-
tion of whether any implicit limitations on article V exist. Early in 
this century, attempts were made to persuade the courts to invali-
date the fifteenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth amendments.43 They 
were based on state-sovereignty arguments that have long since 
gone out of constitutional favor, and even in their day the argu-
ments were decisively rejected. While it is tempting to dismiss the 
controversy as an attempt "to build a mountain" from a mere "con-
stitutional molehill,"44 many of the same arguments are relevant to 
Walter Murphy's recent attempts to breathe new life into the notion 
of implied limits on the amending process. Murphy argues that cer-
tain provisions of the Constitution are so fundamental, and so es-
sential to human dignity, that an amendment repealing them should 
be voided by the courts. 
Murphy offers two examples of unconstitutional amendments. 
The first involves restriction of the first amendment. Murphy rea-
sons as follows: 
I. Incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth means that the 
operative constitutional provision effectively reads: "Neither Congress nor the 
states, singly or together, can make a law 'abridging' freedom of speech, press, as-
sembly, or religion." 
2. Constitutional amendments are law; 
3. Therefore it is outside the scope of state and federal legislative powers to 
41. I do not accept the notion, advanced by Walter Berns, that the equal state suffrage 
proviso would void the amendment proposing that the District of Columbia be treated as a 
state, and my reservations should be clear after full examination of sections III and IV of this 
paper. See Berns, The Forms of Anicle V, 6 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 73, 76-77 (1982). 
42. Linder, supra note 6, at 725. 
43. For a review of this entire controversy and its theoretical implications, see Vile, The 
Amending Process: The Alternative to Revolution, 11 SE. PoL REV. 49-95 (1983). 
44. Linder, supra note 6, at 725. Linder is specifically referring to attempts to read 
implicit reservations into the equal suffrage provision of article V. 
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amend the Constitution and restrict the First Amendment's protections.45 
In a second example Murphy imagines that an "ideology of repres-
sive racism sweeps the country."46 Its proponents muster the requi-
site majorities in Congress and in the states to ratify a constitutional 
amendment endorsing racial discrimination. If such an amendment 
were challenged in court, Murphy does "not see how the Justices, as 
officials of a constitutional democracy, could avoid holding the 
amendment invalid."47 
Murphy outlines three arguments. The first, borrowed from 
the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany, suggests that 
the Constitution is a unit with "an inner unity" and a commitment 
to "certain overarching principles and fundamental decisions to 
which individual provisions are subordinate. "48 In this case, he ar-
gues, "the protection of human dignity" would, as a core constitu-
tional value, take precedence over the racist amendment. Murphy 
adopts a second argument from a court decision in India. He rea-
sons that Americans have chosen "a constitutional democracy 
which enshrines certain values, paramount among which is human 
dignity."49 This value is even more important than the democratic 
procedures by which it was intended to be secured. "By adopting 
and maintaining such a system of values, the American people have 
surrendered their authority, under that system, to abridge human 
dignity by any procedure whatever. "5o Since this Constitution 
makes "no provision for destroying the old polity and creating a 
new one . . . its terms cannot supply legitimate procedures for such 
a sweeping change."5I Murphy further notes that "[c]onstitutional 
tradition establishes a legitimate process for establishing a totally 
new system through a convention chosen from the entire polity."52 
Murphy's third argument is similar to the previous two. Since 
"[t]here are principles above the literal terms of the constitutional 
document," Murphy argues, the racist amendment would be invalid 
as a denial of "the right to respect and dignity," because it sought to 
"contradict the basic purpose of the whole constitutional system. "53 
Despite Murphy's appealing objectives, his arguments should 
be rejected and courts should steer clear of imposing implicit limits 
45. Murphy, The An of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in Es-
SAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 130, 151 (M. Harmon ed. 1978). 
46. Murphy, supra note 35, at 755. 
47. /d. 
48. /d. The material cited is quoted directly from the German court decision. 
49. /d. at 756. 
50. /d. (emphasis in original). 
51. /d. at 757. 
52. /d. (emphasis in original). 
53. /d. 
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on the substance of amendments, even in the extreme circumstances 
Murphy mentions. First, however one may stress the "constitu-
tional" as opposed to the "democratic" aspects of the American 
government,s4 the exercise of judicial power has always been in ten-
sion with popular rule.ss One of the reasons judicial review has 
been acceptable is that the courts' judgments can be revised through 
the amending process. Nor can the potential impact of the amend-
ment process on the courts be measured merely by counting those 
few occasions when it has been directly utilized,s6 since the possibil-
ity may have deterred court decisions in other areas as well. To 
empower the courts to void amendments overturning judicial deci-
sions would surely threaten the notion of a government founded on 
the consent of the governed.s1 
However much one might desire to provide permanent protec-
tion for certain rights, there may indeed come a point where, as 
Benjamin Franklin reminded the Constitutional Convention, the 
people, "shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Govern-
ment, being incapable of any other."ss At that point, which most 
surely would have been reached in Murphy's examples, judicial ob-
struction would be less likely to protect cherished rights than to 
spark revolution. As others have noted, the amending process 
serves a "safety-valve" function.s9 When popular sentiment has 
reached the boiling point, it is unlikely to be calmed by plugging the 
stopper. Even if the courts had the courage to oppose the raging 
tides of opinion in such contingencies-and cases such as Dred 
Scott, Plessy, Gobitis, Korematsu, and Yamashita show that they 
54. The distinction in Murphy's. Murphy argues that "democracy stresses equality and 
popular rule" while "constitutionalism emphasizes that certain rights of the individual citizen 
are protected against government, even against popular government and majority rule." See 
id. at 707-08. 
55. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962); see also Abraham, 
The Judicial Function Under the Constitution: Theory and Practice, NEWS FOR TCHRS OF 
PoL Sci., Spring 1984, at 12. 
56. The threat of using the untried convention mechanism, for example, has been linked 
to the passage of at least four amendments. Connely, Amending the Constitution: Is This 
Any Way to Call For a Constitutional Convention?, 22 ARIZ. L. REv. lOll, 1016 (1980). This 
is why, while agreeing with much of Walter Dellinger's analysis of judicial review of the 
amending process, I am not completely convinced that one can effectively ascertain the 
Court's relation to the amending process by counting the number of times that amendments 
have explicitly been overturned by the Court. See Dellinger, supra note 20, at 414-15. 
Tribe's response to this piece bas been cited in supra note 5. Dellinger rebuts Tribe in Consti-
tutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 HARV. L. REV. 446 (1983). 
57. Tribe, supra note 5 at 435-36. While Tribe agrees with the general point made here, 
he is much more uncomfortable with the notion of consent. Tribe, supra note 5, at 441-42. 
58. 2 THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, supra note 9, at 642. 
59. This specific analogy is found in Williams, What, If Any, Limitations Are There 
Upon the Power to Amend the Constitution of the United States?, 6 VA. L. REv. 161, 167 
(1920). 
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have often failed in similar circumstances-there is little reason to 
believe they would be successful. 
Indeed, if the Court ever did attempt to control the amend-
ment process, that power could as easily be used for ill as for good. 
There seem to be at least as many times in American history where 
the Court could have used implicit limits on the amending process 
to restrict human rights as to expand them. Surely, it would not 
have been preposterous (as Taney showed in Dred Scott) 60 to argue 
that the Constitution was adopted by whites and could not be ex-
tended to others, the Civil War amendments to the contrary 
notwithstanding. For that matter, what would keep the Court from 
voiding amendments to protect the handicapped, the aged, or the 
unborn (protection that the Court has refused to extend in the ab-
sence of such an amendment)61 on the basis that they are not fully 
human? Such examples should give pause to those who would vest 
the courts with even greater powers than they now have. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against implicit limits on the 
amending process focuses on the Founders' intent. The presence of 
two explicit limits in article V, and the deliberate rejection of others, 
seem to argue against the existence of still more. As Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote in regard to provisions in article Ill: "Affirmative 
words are often, in their operations, negative of other objects than 
those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must 
be given to them or they have no operation at all."62 
Admittedly, some of these arguments against Murphy's posi-
tion seem to deny the Court's power to enforce either explicit or 
implicit limits on the substance of amendments. The logic of a writ-
ten constitution is, like the notion of a limited judiciary, however, 
much more compatible with enforcement of explicit limits than 
with implicit limits, and the difference is significant enough to allow 
such a distinction to be drawn. 
These arguments notwithstanding, one must still meet Mur-
phy's own positive examples and arguments. His argument against 
restrictions on the first amendment has the advantage of resting on 
a seemingly explicit, rather than an implicit, constitutional limit, 
but it does not bear up under close scrutiny. While an amendment 
may indeed be a form of law, it is unlikely to be the form referred to 
in the first amendment; the two would rarely be equated in ordinary 
discourse. If the Founders meant no law or amendment, surely 
they would have been explicit, as they were in establishing limits in 
60. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
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article V.63 Moreover, the language of the supremacy clause seems 
to indicate that the terms law and amendment are not used synony-
mously elsewhere in the Constitution.64 Finally, Murphy's argu-
ment is inconsistent with existing constitutional interpretation 
under which Presidents and Governors can veto laws but not 
amendments. 65 
As to Murphy's example of a racist amendment, he first argues 
that unifying constitutional principles should take precedence over 
contrary provisions. This argument is particularly inappropriate to 
a developing document like the United States Constitution. More 
recent constitutional provisions are presumptively in closer accord 
with the consent of the governed than conflicting earlier provisions. 
Surely, the Justices would be foolish to ask today whether blacks 
should be counted as three-fifths of a person or whether Senators 
should be elected by state legislatures. Moreover, a court proceed-
ing from Murphy's assumptions might have heeded past requests to 
void several amendments whose commitment to human dignity 
Murphy now heralds. 
Murphy's second argument is that the nation has opted for a 
system in which the people "have surrendered their authority, 
under that system, to abridge human dignity by any procedure," 
short of, "a convention chosen from the entire polity."66 It is doubt-
ful that the existing Constitution was itself written and adopted in 
such a convention.67 More important, Murphy's proposal ignores 
the very constitutional system it purportedly defends. If use of arti-
cle V, with its strenuous numerical requirements, does not accord 
with the constitutional system, what does? Is Murphy proposing a 
63. Francis H. Heller, addressing a related issue, makes an interesting point when he 
observes that, "A constitution, viewed as a political document, is a framework for the exer-
cise of power in the polity. Legal rules, by contrast, purport to determine the broad range of 
societal relationships. When a constitution is treated as just another form of law, there re-
sults an ambiguity of thought that tends to overshadow significant functional differences." 
Heller, Article V.· Changing Dimensions in Constitutional Change, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 71, 
71-72 (1973). 
64. The language is not conclusive, but it would appear that a proper reading would 
place amendments under the heading of "Constitution" rather than "the Laws of the United 
States." The supremacy clause, found in article VI, reads as follows: "This Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
65. Hawke v. Smith, No. I, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 3 78 ( 1798). 
66. Murphy, supra note 35, at 756-57 (emphasis in original). 
67. The state of Rhode Island did not send delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 
and delegates to the Convention were appointed by state legislatures rather than elected by 
conventions. 
1985] AMENDING PROCESS 385 
Calhounian system of concurrent majorities, with every societal 
group given a veto?6s What if the Court had accepted such argu-
ments, not on behalf of enhancing human dignity, but as a means of 
protecting the South's "peculiar institution," the all-white or all-
male suffrage, or the election of Senators by state legislatures? 
To turn, finally, to Murphy's contention that there are "princi-
ples above the literal terms of the constitutional document,"69 is to 
enter a constitutional morass. Granted that such principles exist, 
what makes the judiciary the guardian of such principles in these 
circumstances? What check would there be on courts that misinter-
preted such principles? As these questions suggest, not every moral 
wrong has a constitutional or judicial remedy. Prudence dictates 
that popular rule and national union may sometimes, at least in the 
short term, have to take priority over the protection of a specific 
conception of human dignity. Ultimately, the best haven for human 
dignity is the cleft of a constitution, changeable by a populace that 
will, over time, be subject to enlightenment and improvement. 
v 
In changing the Constitution, do the people have the right to 
pass unamendable amendments? In raising this question, Douglas 
Linder reminds us that it was a living issue at least once in the 
nation's history, on the occasion of the pre-Civil War Corwin 
Amendment.7o 
Linder's judgment that the Corwin Amendment, and others 
similar to it, would be unconstitutional is worthy of attention, not 
only because Linder reasons that only such amendments are uncon-
stitutional, but also because he recognizes that the existence of ex-
plicit limits in article V undercuts his position.?' Linder 
nonetheless opposes unamendable amendments: 
The prohibition of amendments that would dismantle certain fundamental institu-
tions and arrangements established by the Constitution, including the states them-
selves, was a topic specifically debated by delegates to the Philadelphia Convention; 
the question of amendments that would alter the nature of the Constitution itself 
was not discussed. The debates indicate that the framers wanted the principles and 
institutions established in the Constitution to be open to evaluation and change. 
What is not clear is whether they intended their conception of a Constitution to be 
similarly subject to modification.72 
68. See]. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND SELECTIONS FROM THE 
DISCOURSE 19-22 (C. Posted. 1953). 
69. Murphy, supra note 35, at 757. 
70. Linder, supra note 6, at 728-30. 
71. /d. at 730. 
72. /d. at 730-31 (emphasis in original). 
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Citing evidence that the Founders regarded the Constitution as "a 
vehicle through which change could peaceably occur," Linder adds 
that "[n]othing could be more inconsistent with the conception of 
the living Constitution than an unamendable amendment or an 
amendment authorizing unamendable amendments and which by 
its own terms is unamendable. "73 Such amendments pose the "risk 
of violence and revolutionary change" and "the risk that people will 
grow to disrespect the source of the institutions and arrangements 
that are forced on them."74 Apart from these risks, Linder also sug-
gests that one generation should not be allowed to prevent suc-
ceeding generations from making fundamental moral and political 
choices.7s He concludes that "article V itself cannot be amended so 
as to create any new limitations on the amending power."76 
Presumably, Linder does not think that the precise formula 
mentioned in article V is somehow sacrosanct and inviolable. 
Surely, there is nothing talismanic about the consent of two-thirds 
of both Houses of Congress and three-fourths of the states (as op-
posed, for example, to three-fifths and seven-sixteenths or four-fifths 
and seven-eights). By Linder's own reasoning, the provisions of ar-
ticle V should, upon experience, be subject to the same modifica-
tions as any other constitutional provision. Presumably, Linder 
must consider that an unamendable amendment is distinguishable 
from a mere change of procedure. 
What then of Linder's question, "Is it moral or consistent with 
democratic theory to allow one generation to prevent succeeding 
generations from making certain fundamental moral and political 
choices?" The apparent negative answer does not, in fact, settle the 
controversy. In the first place, such a response calls into question 
the whole notion of a constitution whereby one generation decrees 
that succeeding generations may not change the framers' constitu-
tional handiwork without the concurrence of extraordinary majori-
ties. Beyond this is Linder's own willingness to allow the Founders 
to bind subsequent generations on the issue of equal state suffrage. 
To Linder's question may thus be posed the following counterques-
tions: What gives the current generation less sovereignty than that 
exercised by the Founders? If they could enact an unamendable 
provision, why cannot the present generation? Has the sovereignty 
involved in writing constitutional documents somehow vanished? 
If the answer to this last question is negative, a generation ere-
73. Jd. at 731. 
74. Id. 
75. Jd. at 732. 
76. Id. at 733. 
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ating or modifying a given constitutional system has the right, 
within the rules of that system, to set whatever conditions it thinks 
are necessary to its preservation. Arguably, 11 no generation can 
reasonably claim authority irrevocably to bind the future; by the 
same token, one generation should have the right to say that the 
next generation must choose to follow the forms it has specified or 
choose another system. To analogize, a constitution is like a condi-
tional gift or will. To enjoy it one must accept its stipulations. A 
nation can free itself of the gift or inheritance and its conditions by 
renouncing it altogether, but the nation may not enjoy it without 
abiding by its terms. 
The analysis above certainly casts doubt on Linder's argument 
that the Founders, had they thought about it, would not have in-
tended that "their conception of a Constitution" allowing for 
change, could be altered. As statesmen who recognized that at least 
two limits on the amending process were necessary to institute the 
Union, the Founders probably would not have been shocked to dis-
cover that similar compromises might be utilized to preserve the 
Union. Moreover, arguments like Linder's were rejected by the 
courts when faced with attempts to void the expanded suffrage 
amendments and the prohibition amendment. The latter amend-
ment almost surely grafted a sumptuary regulation that the Foun-
ders would have thought inappropriate in a constitution, but the 
Court wisely refused to declare it unconstitutional. 78 A contrary 
ruling would have subjected all future amendments to a judicial 
hurdle unlikely to have been intended by the Founding Fathers. 
This, of course, speaks only to the constitutional and theoreti-
cal, and not to the prudential, issues. On the latter ground, Linder's 
caution may be well taken. As a rule, unamendable amendments 
are surely not good public policy; extensive resort to such amend-
ments might indeed spark revolution or instill disrespect for the 
Constitution. Only perhaps as a means of saving the Union, or as a 
means of guaranteeing the most fundamental rights, should they be 
utilized. To argue that such amendments are generally unwise, 
however, is not necessarily to say they are constitutional. 79 
77. See Walter Berns's comment: "What we were not permitted to do in 1787·88 was 
to deprive-or pretend to deprive-our posterity of their natural right to do in the future 
what we did in 1776." Berns, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, NAT'L F., Fall 1984, at 31. 
78. The National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). For analysis, see Dellinger, 
supra note 20, at 403-04. 
79. Here Linder may be too cautious. However else Murphy's arguments have been 
received in this paper, they could be taken to stand for the proposition that certain provisions 
(like the first amendment and the equal protection clause) should be guaranteed against con-
stitutional change under our current constitutional system. One might further argue that, if 
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VI 
In concluding, it seems appropriate to consider possible reme-
dies. As a guard against Murphy's worst-case scenarios, one might 
propose that no amendment could be ratified by the states until first 
approved by two or three successive Congresses, or until states con-
ducted hearings on the subject of ratification. This, or some similar 
measure, would expose new amendments to increased publicity and 
reflection before they could be incorporated into the Constitution. 
Murphy's worst-case scenarios seem far too unlikely, however, to 
justify such a change in an already difficult amending process. so It is 
certainly difficult to imagine mobilizing popular support on behalf 
of an amendment to deal with so esoteric an issue. 
It is even less likely that the popular conscience could be suffi-
ciently aroused to ratify an amendment to prevent future unamend-
able amendments. The irony of such a proviso-which, to be 
effective, would have to be unamendable-would itself be enough to 
argue against such a change. Moreover, the need for such a change 
seems dubious, as unamendable amendments do not seem imminent 
and have never been passed in nearly 200 years of practice. 
In the end, then, the arguments surrounding article V do not so 
much point to the need for future constitutional reform, as illumi-
nate the nature and wisdom of the existing constitutional document. 
The Constitution wisely protects liberty by guarding against the 
transient whims of the majority, while placing its ultimate faith in 
the consent of the governed. 
the people are willing to have a revolution to suppress speech or practice racism, the existing 
system has, for all practical purposes, already come to an end. 
80. Writing about the electoral college, Saul Brenner notes, "But the Constitution 
should not be amended to guard against remote possibilities." Brenner, Should the Electoral 
College Be Replaced by the Direct Election of the President?, 17 PS, Spring 1984, at 247. 
